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THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 
& THE RULE OF RECOGNITION 
THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE 
CONTINUITY OF LAW. By RichardS. Kay.' The Catholic 
University of America Press. 2014. Pp. xi + 304. $59.95 
(cloth). 
James A llan 2 
This book by Richard Kay is a joy to read. It is a study of 
England's Glorious Revolution in the late seventeenth century 
written by an American law professor with a well-known 
expertise in constitutional law and constitutional interpretation. 3 
It works on at least three levels. Firstly, there is the legal history 
side of the book. Kay started work on this book in the early 1990s, 
so what you read is the culmination of nearly a quarter-century of 
research, reading and thought. Those who have little idea of the 
events leading up to England's Glorious Revolution will learn all 
the basics. Meanwhile, those who had a pretty solid understanding 
will learn new things. Kay is good on the importance of oaths back 
then. Kay is good on how terribly King 1 ames II played his hand; 
how a Catholic King in an overwhelmingly Protestant kingdom 
made mistake after mistake after mistake until it was too late and 
he had to flee. Kay is good on the Convention Parliament. Kay is 
good on the lurking background importance of Cromwell and the 
events of 1648-1660 to what would happen some three decades 
later. Kay even helped clear up for me a vague confusion I had 
never really bothered to sort out. Why is it that you sometimes 
would read of some event linked to the Glorious Revolution, say 
the Declaration of Rights, as having taken place in 1688 and at 
1. Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. 
2. Garrick Professor of Law, T.C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. 
3. See, e.g., Richard Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, X2 Nw.U. L. REV. 226 (199X); "Originalist" 
Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 335 ( 1996); Original 
Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 703 
(2009). 
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other times see that same event being dated to 1689? It was the 
calendar and from when the start of the new year is dated. While 
the French had moved over to the more accurate Gregorian 
calendar in the 1580s, the English were still on the Julian (and 
would remain on the Julian till the 1750s). Under the latter, the 
start of the new year was then March 25, not 1 anuary 1. In 
addition, by the time of the events of the Glorious Revolution 
there was a ten day difference between the two callendars. Taken 
together, some of what we today would say had happened in 1689 
would back then in England (or in the 13 colonies, for that matter) 
be said to have taken place in 1688. 
There is a second side to this book, however, because as 
Kay makes clear "[t]his book is ... a legal history of the 
Revolution" (p. ix, emphasis in the original). Yes, the history 
matters, but it matters to Kay because of the way it illustrates just 
how important law was to the revolutionaries and, relatedly, how 
crucial legal justifications for their actions were to them. This is 
not surprising, as Kay's very first sentence in the book, in the 
Preface, is: "I came to the study of the Glorious Revolution of 
1688-89 from the study of constitutional law" (p. ix). Likewise, it 
is not surprising that this book can also be thought of as an 
extended study of constitutional law issues. There are questions 
related to parliamentary sovereignty. There are questions about 
what constitute the sources of law. There are all the issues thrown 
up by the tensions between change and continuity, between those 
who appeal to theory and those to history, and between the 
exhilarating attraction of wide-open unconstrained scope for 
action, as opposed to the comforting safety provided by the 
constraints of the established law. There is even much discussion 
of the conduct of judges in resolving these issues, which 
tangentially brings up all the issues of interpretation which 
constitutional law scholars ponder on a daily basis. There are all 
these, plus consideration of the Rule of Law's consistency with 
revolutionary change, and more. Despite the focus on events in 
England nearly 330 years ago, this is very much a book for those 
interested in contemporary constitutional law. 
Then there is the jurisprudential side of this book. On a third 
level, you can read this book as an exercise in applied legal 
philosophy. "What counts as law?" is a constant refrain. So too is 
the desire to mask revolutionary change, to finesse it and pretend 
that there is continuity, when pretty much everyone knows that 
there is not. There is the persistence of legal argument in the midst 
of bootstrap operations at the start of new legal regimes. And 
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perhaps most perplexingly, there is the fundamental issue of how 
to understand what H.L.A. Hart dubbed "the rule of 
recognition. "4 
I came to read Kay's book as a law professor who teaches 
both constitutional law and jurisprudence courses in Australia. 
Before that, I worked and taught broadly similar courses in New 
Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong and about the United Kingdom 
(while living in Hong Kong). I mention that because, on the 
straightforward plane of knowing the Westminster constitutional 
model, it struck me that Kay knows more than most British, 
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand legal academics. He 
certainly knows the Westminster system inside and out. 
In the rest of this short review, therefore, I will play to my 
strengths and focus on the second and third sides to this book, the 
aspects related to constitutional law and to legal philosophy. I will 
pick out just three themes raised in Kay's book, note why these 
three were important back in the late 1600s in England, and then 
consider them more widely in today's world. 
1. FICTIONS AND FINESSING 
The revolutionaries in 1688 were overwhelmingly not 
outsiders. They had a big stake in the existing system. Core 
religious differences with King James II, and the birth of a son of 
his sure to be raised a Catholic, led the makers of the Revolution 
to act. Yet the failed experiment with Cromwell was within living 
memory for many of these actors. It worried almost all of them. 
As Kay puts it, "By 1688, almost everyone had learned that 
contempt for the law could lead to disaster" (p. 56, internal 
footnote omitted). Accordingly, there was "a powerful tendency 
to favor, so far as practicalities allowed, the apparently legal over 
the openly revolutionary" (p. 56). 
With the arrival of William and Mary, James II's flight to 
France, and a new but precarious equilibrium beginning to form, 
the Convention Parliament met during the interregnum. Yet the 
legal status of this Convention was itself dubious, highly dubious. 
Indeed the calling, meeting and decision-making of this 
Convention Parliament of January and February 1689 required 
some sort of legal justification to be given, since Parliaments were 
called into being by the King with his issuing of the writs, and that 
plainly had not occurred. Likewise legal justification was also 
4. H. L. A. HART, TilE CONCEPT OF LAW Y7, YY (1% I). 
512 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:509 
needed for the severing of the hereditary principle, the core 
constitutional pillar that kings were not chosen nor elected but 
given by God (as it were). In both instances, the makers of the 
Revolution were pushed to fall back on fictions and the finessing 
or ignoring of questions that were otherwise unanswerable. 
Meanwhile the sort of law that was appealed to and relied upon 
to justify the new order generally depended upon how much those 
doing the appealing desired change: 
Notwithstanding some undeniable exceptions, those who 
wished the fewest changes in constitutional arrangements 
tended to refer to positive law which was specific, concrete and 
historically identifiable - statutes, judgments, precedents. 
Advocates of more far-reaching changes in the distribution of 
constitutional authority were more likely to cite a vaguer and 
more abstract kind of law- natural law, broad principles, and 
the practices of an immemorial, and thus unverifiable, past (pp. 
57-58). 
Loosely speaking, the mapped spectrum of wanting-fewest-
constitutional-changes-to-most ran from Jacobites through Tories 
through Whigs to Radical Whigs. However, all but committed 
supporters of James at one end and outright and outspoken 
radical revolutionaries at the other were forced to appeal to 
constitutional fictions, to finesse the seemingly illegal, and 
sometimes simply to assert what was patently not the case. 
Take the above-mentioned hereditary principle and how the 
makers of the Glorious Revolution might characterize its seeming 
breach. The Convention Parliament considered three 
alternatives. One was an appeal to an "original contract"5 (pp. 77-
84) between ruler and ruled. If such a contract existed, then its 
breach by King James II would go some way to justifying the fact 
the Crown had passed to James's Protestant daughter Mary and 
her co-religionist husband William. This type of approach to 
justifying the inroads made to the otherwise inviolable hereditary 
principle was very much in line with the thinking of John Locke 
(pp. 78, 112). Yet, at the time, this option for revolution-
rationalizing was seen as too radical by most (including by most 
Whigs) and downright implausible by some: 
William Atwood, a Whig barrister, was a popular and 
influential apologist for the Revolution. He drew conclusions 
remarkably similar to those of Locke, asserting, for example, 
that in the "last resort," judgment "must needs be in the 
5. Today we would talk in terms of a social contract rather than original contract. 
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people, the question being of the exercise of their original 
power" so that "their voice is as the voice of Ciod." But for 
Atwood this argument was derived "not only from the equity 
of the law but from the very letter ... ". In contrast to the ''letter 
of the law," he distrusted "thin and metaphysical notions" of 
natural right "which few arc masters of and judges of," and he 
described the concept of "inherent and unalienable rights of 
mankind" as "wheedling" (p.79, internal footnotes omitted). 
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Put bluntly, John Locke and his original contract thinking 
amounted to little more than fringe players in supporting and 
justifying the Glorious Revolution (p. 113). 
A second possibility for the makers of the Revolution was to 
appeal to the law of nations, to suggest that this then nascent sort 
of international law, somehow or other, trumped the long-
established constitutional law of England which had the 
hereditary principle at its core (pp. 84-88). The trick was to look 
here for some sort of "legal" basis supporting a general right of 
resistance. Now at core "the similarity [of these sort of arguments] 
... to those of some home-grown exponents of the abstract 
contract was painfully clear" (p. 87). Hence, this type of appeal to 
international law horrified the Tories and won very few takers 
even amongst the Whigs. This option was also a flop in the 
Convention Parliament. 
The third option was to say, with as straight a face as 
possible, that King James II had abdicated-that he had vacated 
the throne when he had fled to France. This was the home of the 
outright legal fiction, the careful finessing of the seeming rupture 
in what the Constitution demanded. It was where misgovernment 
would be transmogrified into voluntary resignation by a 
"transubstantiating vote" (p. 169) of the Convention Parliament. 
It was also the option that was overwhelmingly the most popular, 
for Whigs nearly as much as Tories, and the one that was chosen. 
Just assert that the hereditary principle had not been breached 
because King James II had voluntarily abdicated his Crown. 
When James fled he had effected his own demise. No, his fleeing 
had done more than that. He had effected his own demise as well 
as that of his new born son, a Catholic, whose rights were also 
forfeited and who would henceforth be mentioned as sparingly as 
possible (p. 279). 
Of course it was not just the makers of the Glorious 
Revolution who could find these three items on the "how to 
rationalize your revolution" menu. The makers of any 
revolution -slow-moving, subtle and peaceful ones as much as 
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the abrupt, overt and violent- might use thern. They might 
attempt to justify their actions 1) by appeal to amorphous natural 
law principles by way of some sort of hypothetical original or 
social contract; 2) by appeal beyond domestic law to the norms of 
international law; or 3) by reliance on the out-and-out fiction that 
they have not really done anything revolutionary, not really, and 
when pressed finesse as many precedents and constitutional 
principles as possible. 
We can see this only eight decades later in the successful 
revolution that followed the American War of [ndependence. 
When it came to justifying the American actions, Locke and his 
theories came into their own for the makers of that revolution. 
Meanwhile, if we shift to more recent times and the types of nearly 
imperceptible revolutions occasioned when top judges interpret a 
written constitution to produce answers few honesdy believe that 
Constitution actually dictated, we will sometimes see appeals to 
internationallaw6 and sometimes the use of outright fictions and 
finessing. The latter occurs where top judges reach interpretive 
conclusions that markedly depart from the prior understanding of 
what the Constitution means.7 
2. JUDGES AND PARLIAMENT 
Before the Glorious Revolution, the monarch was not 
unconstrained in what he or she could do. Parlian1ent had some 
checking power, it was just unclear how much. So while it was 
the religious issue that provided the political substance of the 
grievances of 1688, the constitutional point on which issue was 
joined was the dispensing and suspending powers that James 
invoked to relieve Catholics of the disabilities imposed by 
statute. The dispute was yet another iteration of the still-
unresolved question of the extent to which royal power could 
be exercised unilaterally (p. 40). 
fl. For a sample of cases that do this, sec Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) in 
the United States; Al-Kateh v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 in Australia; and R. v. Hapc 
1200712 SCR 291 in Canada. See also James Allan, Ineffective, Opaque and Undemocratic: 
The IOUs of-Too Much-Internationall.aw and Why a Bit of Skepticism is Warranted, 
50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. X33 (2013). 
7. For the United States, sec Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); in Australia, 
"implied rights" cases including Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 
(1992) 177 CLR 106; for Canada, sec Reference Re Supreme Court Act,§§ 5 and fl, 2014 
sse 21, or Carter V. Canada (AG) 2015 sse 5. 
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In other words, what was the scope of the king's unfettered regal 
discretion? Or, in different terms, what was the relative authority 
of the King and what was that of Parliament (p. 131 )? 
The Glorious Revolution, the Bill of Rights, and then 
Parliament's laying down of the line of succession in the Act of 
Settlement 1701 made it clear that whatever the limits on the King 
had been before, a good deal more of them existed afterwards. In 
fact, the trajectory of the coming into being of the doctrine and 
core British constitutional principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty-a doctrine and principle which was not some gift of 
the judges and the common law, as Jeffrey Goldsworthy has made 
clearx- takes off after the Glorious Revolution. If one's time 
horizon is the medium-to-long-term, Parliament was the big 
winner from this revolution. 
That said, being a judge in revolutionary times is an 
employment fraught with danger. Kay does an excellent job 
outlining some of these difficulties. Take the pre-revolutionary 
judges of the King's Bench who heard the Godden v Hales case in 
1686, an important case on the dispensing power in which all but 
one of the judges agreed in the judgment given in favor of the 
King. These judges ended up on the wrong side of events; they 
had given a judgment on a highly contentious issue that would be 
_mentioned and condemned in Prince William of Orange's 
invasion declaration. Similarly, " [ t ]he participating judges, 
William Garroway would later claim in the Commons, were guilty 
of 'a breach of their oath, and a great one"' (p. 41, internal 
footnote omitted). In fact, Kay devotes a good chunk of the fourth 
chapter of this five-chapter book to the subsequent treatment of 
the judges who had participated in that case. In general terms, it 
will surprise no one to learn that having been a judge who had 
been dismissed by James, or who had resigned, in no way hurt 
one's post-revolutionary prospects in later William and Mary 
days. If your usual framework for thinking about the role of 
judges in revolutionary times is Apartheid South Africa, England 
in 1688 and 1689 offers a nice change. 
Meanwhile, what can be said of parliamentary sovereignty 
in today's world? This is the core notion, uncontroversially at the 
heart of the British Constitution until well past World War II, that 
there are no legal or constitutional constraints on what the elected 
parliament can do, only moral and political limits. Now 
parliamentary sovereignty no doubt waxed after the Glorious 
X. JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT (1YY9). 
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Revolution. Yet in quite recent times it has appeared to wane in 
the United Kingdom. There was Britain's entry into the then 
European Economic Community, now European Union, 
formalized with the passage of the European Cmnmunities Act 
1972.9 There was the House of Lords Factortame 10 case, making 
clear that in the light of that statute, certainly on day-to-day 
matters, English law would be read as consistent with European 
law-meaning that this 1972 statute's incorporation of such law 
could trump later statutes (or at least those not explicitly taking 
the U.K. out of the E.U.), thereby driving a truck through the 
doctrine of implied repeal. There was the Blair government's 
innovation of a statutory bill of rights. 11 This statutory bill of 
rights, unlike the entrenched American or Canadian models, does 
not allow statutes to be invalidated, or struck down. And yet by 
means of a New Zealand-style "reading down provision" -or 
"read all other statutes as consistent with the enumerated rights if 
it is at all possible" directive to the judges 12 - and a Declaration of 
Incompatibility provision, 13 the power balance between 
Parliament and the unelected judiciary has altered significantly. 
Some U.K. legal academics, such as Aileen Kavanagh, now say 
that the top British judges are just as powerful as top American 
ones. 
14 There were also the Blair government's Scotland Act 15 and 
Judicial Appointments innovations, 16 and the Cameron 
government's fixed terms between elections legislation. 17 And of 
course there was the Blair/Brown government's signing of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 1x 
9. European Communities Act 1972 (U.K.). 
10. R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd I19H9l2 All ER 692. 
11. The Human Rights Act 199H (U.K.). 
12. !d. at§ 3. 
13. /d. at § 4. The judges arc made the arhiters of what is rights-respecting and then 
can declare that some statute is, in their view, not rights-respecting. The legislature is 
thereafter left with the option of doing nothing, and hence, given thi:s framework, hcing 
deemed to he taking away people's rights. Or the legislature can amend the infringing 
statute. Well over two dozen such declarations have hcen made. To the hest of my 
knowledge the Parliament has stood up to the judges only once. 
14. See AILEEN KAVANAGII, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE U.K. HUMAN 
RIG I ITS ACT (2009). 
15. Scotland Act 19HH (U.K.). This statute is rcpcalahle in theory. Parliament has the 
legal and constitutional power to do so. But it is not ahle to he repealed as a matter of 
political practice. There is no plausihle way for the Parliament in London to take hack 
these "more powers to Scotland" reforms. 
16. Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (U.K.). This statute created the Judicial 
Appointments Commission. 
17. Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 (U.K.). 
1H. European Union (Amendment) Act 200H (U.K.). 
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After all of those changes, in what sense can we say today 
that the United Kingdom parliament is sovereign? Certainly it is 
so in a less full-blooded sense than half a century ago. Yes, were 
Parliament to enact legislation to leave the European Union, that 
law would prevail. 19 So there is parliamentary sovereignty in that 
sense. Yes, Parliament alone is free to repeal the Human Rights 
Act. 20 So there is parliamentary sovereignty in that sense, one not 
shared by the legislatures of Canada and the United States. Yes, 
in theory the Westminster Parliament might rescind Scottish 
devolution, though the real life chances of that ever happening 
hover barely above zero. Still, all that and more conceded, today's 
parliamentary sovereignty looks to be an enervated version of 
what existed a mere half century ago. In today's world, in my 
opinion, if you are looking for non-emasculated parliamentary 
sovereignty you need to look to New Zealand rather than Britain. 
3. THE RULE OF RECOGNITION 
Any revolution severs to some extent or other what had 
been until then that jurisdiction's "rule of recognition." As I noted 
above, that term was coined by the legal philosopher H.L.A. 
Hart, 21 and it refers to a jurisdiction's ultimate test of legal validity, 
the ultimate ground of legal authority where law runs out and 
morality and politics are what must be appealed to for 
justification. 
We have seen already how the hereditary principle was 
severed in the Glorious Revolution, though that breach was 
finessed and disguised as far as was plausible. That was a breach 
of a core element of the then rule of recognition. And then there 
were the substantive obstacles in the path of establishing a new 
monarchy, and so in part at least a new rule of recognition. These 
"arose most acutely in connection with the design and 
administration of the oaths to the new king and queen'' (p. 144). 
How did the conscientious man who took his earlier oath to King 
James seriously, how did that man swear now that William and 
Mary were the "lawful and rightful" (p. 146) sovereigns, as the 
traditional oath demanded? The only pathway out of this 
19. The Conservative Party has promised a referendum on this issue, which if it 
delivered a 'leave' result, would presumahly also deliver that outcome via legislation. 
20. And indeed a significant portion of the Conservative party wishes to do just that. 
See Helen Warrell, Conservative Party Sets Sights on Scrapping /Iuman Rights Act, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 11, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2ac115a-17f0-11e4-962h-
00144fcah7de.html#axzz3a6pvlgSB. 
21. HART, supra note 4, at 97, 9Y. 
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dilemma was to redesign the oath, and make no reference to 
"rightful and lawful" nor include any promise of continuing 
loyalty to William and Mary's "heirs and successors" (p. 146). 
Instead, the oath was pared down to a bare minimum, where one 
would "sincerely promise and swear that [he] will be faithful and 
bear true allegiance to [William and Mary]" (p. 146). Such are the 
foundations on which successful revolutions, and revamped rules 
of recognition, are built. 
As Kay puts it, this "streamlined oath was one 
manifestation of the de facto theory of allegiance" (p. 146). It side-
stepped the issue of whether William's title was legal or not, 
merely specifying what the oath taker would do. Better yet, it 
worked as a gloss on the law of treason, it being a serious problem 
for subjects in times of civil strife and revolution to decide exactly 
who was the king. "The de facto doctrine provided a defense for 
those who ended up choosing incorrectly" (p. 147).. 
Of course every new rule of recognition starts with events 
that were not themselves authorized under the old rule of 
recognition. Or, in Kay's blunter terms, "[a]lllaw ... starts with 
revolution. It follows that, to the extent that a society values the 
rule of law, the illegal origin of every legal system subverts its own 
legitimacy" (p. 272). Yet, this slowly fades with the passage of 
time. "At some point the revolution ceases to be seen as a rupture 
in the old law but as the founding of a new one" (p. 272). How 
quickly this occurs will vary, no doubt depending in part upon how 
the previous rule of recognition was perceived. Yet., as time passes 
the rationale for that revolution can safely become ever more 
radical. In the year 1709 in England the Whigs attempted to re-
characterize the Revolution's rationale from being "a simple 
application of accepted legal rules to unusual circumstances [to 
being] an exercise of justified resistance against an oppressive 
king" (p. 274), in the course of the impeachment of the preacher 
Henry Sacheverell. It was too soon. The attempt failed. "[T]hey 
could not overcome the force of the legalist explanation" (p. 276). 
"Popular opinion was on Sacheverell's side" (p. 279). He escaped 
with no fine and no imprisonment, the toast of the town. In the 
parliamentary elections that followed soon afterwards, the Whigs 
were crushed. 
Yet "[l]ittle by little ... it became safer to describe the 
Revolution accurately-as the overturning of one legal system 
and the inauguration of a new one" (p. 279). By the 1760s, 
Blackstone was doing it; Samuel Johnson was doing it; by the 
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1790s, Edmund Burke was too. The rule of recognition had 
changed and it was now acceptable to say so. 
For the legal philosopher, however, there is the 
fundamental issue of how to understand our rule of recognition. 
As Larry Alexander puts it: "[W]hat is our rule of recognition? I 
regard that question as one of the two most difficult questions in 
legal philosophy. "22 Hart famously saw the rule of recognition as 
a source-based test that focused on officials; to find the ultimate 
test of legal validity you look to see, from amongst the pool of 
social rules in a jurisdiction, which ones (~fficials accepted, and 
were prepared to apply as legal rules. The criteria the officials 
accept as determinative of legal validity give us a jurisdiction's test 
of legal validity. 
The attractive thing about Hart's rule-based concept of law, 
with his account of the rule of recognition recounted from the 
outsider's vantage, 23 is that it can be applied to any legal system, 
ever. Application of the Hartian framework is not restricted to 
some nice benevolent Western legal system. You can apply it to 
feudal systems, Stalinist Russia, the United States today, 
anywhere. Dworkin, by contrast, with his theory of law built out 
of a theory of how best to interpret, offers a legal theory of next 
to no application in non-democracies, or indeed in any jurisdiction 
without an independent (and possibly a common-law-based) 
judiciary. His can be applied only to a miniscule fraction of the 
legal systems the world has seen. 
The near universal applicability of Hart's theory is, to my way 
of thinking, a big advantage. Yet Alexander points out a problem 
for Hart. "One would think, however, that citizens as well as 
officials would have to accept those criteria, lest the officials 
would be nothing more than 'the gunman writ large' vis-a-vis the 
citizens. "24 As Alexander explains in a footnote, Hart had 
attacked Austin's (and, I might add, perhaps indirectly, also 
Bentham's) command theory of law, not least because it "could 
not distinguish laws from the threats of gunmen." 25 And any rule 
of recognition test focused on what officials accept certainly 
seems vulnerable, in many jurisdictions, to being collapsed into 
the gunman writ large scenario- the very one Hart tried to evade 
22. Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique, 
51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623,642 (2014) (emphasis in the original). 
23. See JAMES ALLAN, TilE VANTAGE OF LAW: ITS ROLE IN THINKING ABOUT 
LAW, JUDGING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS (2011 ). 
24. Alexander, supra note 22, at 642 (internal footnote omitted). 
25. /d. at 642 n.106. 
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by moving to a rule-based concept of law. In other words, the 
widespread applicability of Hart's understanding of the rule of 
recognition comes at a cost, some would say a hefty cost. 
Alexander's alternative, to look at what criteria "citizens as 
well as officials" 26 would accept, seems to me to take us back to a 
theory of Dworkin-like levels of applicability. In a nice, 
benevolent, democratic, Western jurisdiction, such as the United 
States, we can ask what the people (as well as officials) have 
accepted as determinative of legal validity. I doubt, though, that 
the question is worth asking in North Korea. Of course, even 
limited in the way Alexander does to a jurisdiction such as the 
United States, finding an answer may surpass us all. As Alexander 
makes clear, popular acquiescence when top judges depart from 
the prior understanding of what a Constitution means is not 
enough, not unless people knew it in fact was a departure. And 
how do we test for that? 
The rule of recognition is a slippery concept. This may just 
be one of those "pay your money and pick your poison" 
situations. If forced to choose, I think on balance [prefer Hart's 
understanding, though any choice carries costs. Yet my larger 
point is that Kay's wonderful book throws issues such as these into 
the seventeenth-century setting of the Glorious Revolution and 
makes you think again about them. 
As I said to start, the book is a joy to read. If I were pushed 
to find fault, it would be with the index, which was a tad truncated 
given the nature of the book. But that is the merest of quibbles. 
This is a book worth buying. 
26. !d. at 642. 
